Why Israel is bad for jews pt. 1

In response to discussions I often have with people in Beirut and elsewhere, I am starting a series of posts which will link to articles and news items mentioning the reasons why Israel as an exclusively jewish ‘nation’ state (‘nation’ because the jews are a religious community and not a people or a nation in any genetic or even cultural sense) and as a Euro-American imperialist project (where Arab, African and Asian jews are treated as second-class citizens, only barely above the third-class citizen level of the native non-jewish Arabs) is walking on its last legs. When people ask me why I came to live in this region, I often tell them ‘I came to witness the death of Israel’. Incredulous looks and sarcastic answers such as ‘well, you’ll be around for a long time then’ typically follow. But I am sincerely convinced that the end of one of the world’s last overtly colonial projects is very near. Global public opinion is reaching the levels of critical mass that forced the South African apartheid regime out of existence. The slow but sure economic and imperial demise of the US (caused in no small measure by Israel’s virtual takeover of the US political establishment) is another factor. So is the fact of the IDF’s reversed military fortunes at the hands of Hizbullah in 2000 and again in 2006. This ‘army’ is now forced to slaughter defenceless civilians in Gaza in order to ‘restore its self-confidence and power of ‘deterrence’. But the most important contribution is made by the Israeli political and military establishment’s combination of ridiculous hubris and self-complacent blindness to what is happening around them – Israel as it is now will simply suicide by itself. And that moment is near, although very few people are able to see it now. If you have read any history, you will be aware that empires have always collapsed at the exact moment when they seemed strongest and most invulnerable, and very few observers ever see the collapse coming. None of this, by the way, should be construed as ‘anti-semitism’: a lot of zionists and pro-Israel fanatics are not jews, and conversely  most jews are not zionists or even particularly pro-Israel. Neither is it a matter of ‘driving the jews into the sea’ or such nonsense – white South Africans are still living in post-apartheid South Africa, and they still dominate that country economically – I foresee something similar happening to the jews of Israel after their regime has collapsed and some kind of modus vivendi is established with the Palestinians and the rest of the Middle Eastern population in a new state (and no, the ‘two-state solution’ doesn’t stand a prayer’s chance in hell – it is way too late for that).

The tell-tale signs of Israel’s imminent demise include a continuing negative immigration record (Israel has never succeeded in attracting more than a minority of the world’s jews, despite the mossad’s vicious anti-semitic terroroist campaigns in Arab countries and elsewhere), the presence of anti-semitic skinheads imported from Russia in Israel and even in the IDF, the increasingly desperate legal attempts to oppress even the freedom of expression of Palestinians with Israeli citizenship, the loss of allegiance of the Israeli druze, the increasing difficulty of the Israeli propaganda machine to convince public opinion worldwide of their ‘moral superiority’ and ‘purity of arms’, and there are many others. Here’s an article by Jonathan Cook detailing one of the ways in which zionists are the jews’ worst enemies, as well as one of the ways in which Israel is increasingly squandering any moral capital and goodwill they may have left in the eyes of both jews and others around the world: ‘A quarter of a million Holocaust survivors are reported to be in Israel, with one-third of them living in poverty, according to welfare organisations.
Shraga Elam, an Israeli investigative financial journalist based in Zurich, said after the war many Israelis showed little sympathy for the European Jewish refugees who arrived in Israel. “David Ben Gurion [Israel’s first prime minister] notoriously called them ‘human dust’, and I remember as children we referred to them as sabonim, the Hebrew word for soap,” he said, in reference to the rumoured Nazi practice of making soap from Jewish corpses. “In fact, I can’t think of any place in the world where [Holocaust] survivors are as badly treated as they are in Israel,” Mr Elam said. He said Bank Leumi’s “lost” accounts were only a small fraction of Holocaust assets held by Israeli companies and the Israeli state that should have been returned. The total could be as much as $20bn.’

Peru not Iran

I absolutely agree with Johann Hari that the current uprising in Peru is far more significant on a global scale than the over-exposed protests in Iran (not to mention the long overdue death of a walking plastic-surgery-warning annex has-been-superstar): ‘While the world nervously watches the uprising in Iran, an even more important uprising has been passing unnoticed – yet its outcome will shape your fate, and mine. In the depths of the Amazon rainforest, the poorest people in the world have taken on the richest people in the world to defend a part of the ecosystem none of us can live without. They had nothing but wooden spears and moral force to defeat the oil companies – and, for today, they have won.’ Which is infinitely more inspiring and interesting than the undecided outcome between two feuding rapacious, corrupt and fundamentalist elite figures, even if the tensions in Iran’s society have now risen to the point where frustrated youth without a future will use any excuse to riot. To a background of the US and the UK desperately trying to pull off another 1953 and start the cycle all over again: ‘After all was said and done, Prime Minister Mossadegh had been deposed and a military coup returned the monarchy to Iran by installing the pro-western Mohammed Reza Pahlevi on the Peacock throne. The Shah’s brutal, tyrannical dictatorship – established, supported, and funded by the United States – lasted 26 years. In 1979, the Iranian people returned the favor.’

Oh, and what I presumed earlier tonight (while packing stuff to move house) was more celebatory gunfire and some wedding involving fireworks, was actually a fight between Amal and Mustaqbal militias involving guns and RPGs which killed – surprise, surprise – an innocent passer-by and none of the courageous heroes involved on either side… – in a minor replay of the Iranian feud between two etc etc. And note how naharnet keeps referring to the May 2008 clashes as ’sectarian’, whereas they were purely and obviously political.

Oh bis, Netanyahu has announced that a government involving seven Hezbollah ministers will be held responsible for etc etc bla bla bla… How Haaretz (or Reuters?) knows that there will be seven Hezbollah ministers in the yet-to-be-negotiated new government is worth wondering about in the first place (Hezbollah and Amal together had only five ministers in the last government and they are furthermore supposed to have ‘lost’ these elections), but seriously – don’t these shlomos ever get it? Yes, Israel, you will still get the blame when you go off on your next ethnic massacre, whatever you say. Because it’s what you do that matters, not what you say.  And then we will be another step closer to the end of the ongoing suicidal saga that is Israel, its own worst enemy now as before. A saga that will reach its catharsis much sooner than generally expected. Critical mass is accumulating...

Debunking the Friedman myths

Deen Sharp at his Lebanese Elections blog writes a useful and concise piece debunking the main myths spun by Friedman and other opinion makers in the Western press about the recent elections – and which make very little sense to anybody following the situation on the ground:

‘1. A solid majority of Lebanese Christians voted against the list of Michel Aoun (as stated by Friedman in his candy floss covered article). The FPM itself has 10 MPs, which is the same as the LF and Kataeb combined so the FPM is still the largest Christian party. While, the Change and Reform bloc consists of 27 MPs only beaten by the March 14 bloc itself. A solid majority of Christians did not vote against Aoun.
2. A solid majority of all Lebanese — Muslims, Christians and Druse — voted for the March 14 coalition led by Saad Hariri, the son of the slain Lebanese prime minister, Rafik Hariri (again Friedman). The popular vote went 800,000 for March 8 (and FPM) and 700,000 for March 14. A solid majority of all Lebanese did not vote for the March 14 coalition. This was still a confessional electoral system and the vote was split along confessional lines, except in the Christian areas, thus “all Lebanese” did not vote for March 14.
3.Obama’s speech won the elections for March 14 and that the visits by Biden and Clinton persuaded Christian voters to vote for March 14 (Simon Tisdall of the Guardian and many other international commentators): While, of course this is not very tangible and is a simple matter of opinion I challenge this comment on the basis of where the elections were won: Zahle that went 7-0 to March 14 a result even the most ardent March 14 supporters were not expecting. The primary reason for this win is the 70% turnout of the Sunni population that occurred because of extensive persuasion by Saad Hariri. I have been told by someone working at the Kataeb offices on election day that Hariri made a call to coax Sunni voters to go out and vote, at around 3pm they came in bus loads. The idea that this exceptional Sunni turnout was becuase they were inspired by the Obama/Biden/Clinton (OBC) brigade to go out and vote in such force is highly suspect. I would even doubt many in Zahle even know who Biden and Clinton are and am suspicious as to how much the Sunnis of Zahle like Obama regardless of how many Quranic verses he quotes! In Beirut One, the other vital district, it may be more believable that the OBC brigade had some sort of effect. Personally, I feel it is much more likely that May 7th of last year when Hezbollah took over much of Beirut and the Aoun-Hezbollah agreement over 2006 cost the FPM the five seats in this district. In both districts and nationally Patriarch Sfeir’s last minute intervention on the side of March 14 is seen as having a significant effect in persuading Christian voters to go vote for March 14. But of course for most western commentators this does not fit into the secular-democratic-Obama-miracle that is March 14 against Iran narrative they are constructing.‘ The emphasis is mine: this is an important point, which is also reflected in the Western mass media largely ignoring decidedly undemocratic and unsecular Saudi Arabia supporting the 14th of March with large wads of money, reportedly spending more on Hariri’s re-election than the entire campaign budget of Barack Obama himself – this in a country with barely 4 million inhabitants and an electorate of roughly a million and a half. It also ignores the presence in Hariri’s bloc of important factions of both sunni and christian fundamentalists, and the extent to which March 14th has played on sectarian fears and explicit racism and ‘shiaphobia’ during their entire campaign – and of which Sfeir’s remark is only one example.)

Proportional representation

In a clear illustration of the undemocratic nature of the first-past-the-post system as practiced in the US, the UK and Lebanon, the ‘opposition’ in this country has won only 57 out of 128 seats in parliament despite receiving 55% of the votes. As Dyab Abou Jahjah writes: ‘Despite losing the elections due to the non-proportionate electoral system, the Lebanese opposition won the popular vote by a large margin. From 1,495,000 votes casted 815,000 voted for the opposition while only 680,000 voted for the government parties of the 14 march coalition in a difference of almost 10 percent in favor of the opposition.Within the same frame, progressive Arab Nationalist candidates gathered in total 140,258 votes out of the total of 1,495,000 votes cast in the Lebanese elections. this is equal to 9.38 percent of the votes and had the system been a proportional system this would account for 12 seats in parliament, now they have won none. Changing the election law into a proportional one is the only way forward in Lebanon and should be the priority for the coming 4 years.’

As3ad Abu Khalil (Angry Arab) offers the following analysis: ‘I am still waiting to see the full numbers of the Lebanese elections: we need a breakdown by polling places to analyze the voting behavior according to sect. I did examine yesterday the results of the election on the basis of all the electoral districts: and we can draw some conclusions because many districts have sectarian preponderance. Here are some conclusions. Hizbullah (not Amal) has the overwhelming support of Shi`ites in Lebanon. The level of support is as high as 90% to 93% overall (you can see that in pure Shi`ite districts like Nabatiyyah for example). In fact, we can conclude from Shi`ite voting in Jizzin that voters went for `Awn’s list and not the Amal list: showing you that Hizb controls the Shi`ite vote although Hizbullah needs Birri only for negotiation with other sects and with the outside world. Prince Muqrin and allegedly the US spent millions to prop up Ahmad Al-As`ad (the son of a Shi`ite za`im) and he could not even be a factor and he ran in Marji`yun only to get the March 14….Christian votes in that area. (And the few Shi`ite members of the Hariri bloc who are paraded before Western cameras and reporters all came in districts where non-Shi`ite voters determined the outcome: like Zahlah and Beirut 2 and Biqa`). We can also draw this conclusion about Sunnis: Hariri family has the overwhelming support of the Sunnis of Lebanon: Hizbullah has a hard time dealing with this fact, and accepting it. This partly explains why the results of the election were what they were. For example, the biggest surprise of the election was in the predominantly Christian area of Zahlah: but the results were swayed by the Sunni vote (and the huge turnout). Here is another facet: Sunni Hariri voters are more intense in their support for the group than Shi`ite voters–if you judge them by their voting turnout. But this could be rural-urban as urban voters voted more than rural voters. Sunni support for Hariri has increased in the last four years: the numbers speak for themselves. Hariri family does not enjoy the same level of support among Sunnis that Hizbullah enjoy among Shi`ites but it is very close. The most stunning shift for example was in Sidon. It is not that Usamah Sa`d (the secular Arab nationalist candidate) did not win: it is that he lost big and was only able to capture a mere 27% of the Sunni vote. Why is that important: because he (through his candidate `Abdur-Rahman Bizri) was able to win agaisnt Hariri family in the last municipal election during Rafiq Hariri’s lifetime (by the way, did you know that Rafiq Hariri died? Well, he did and his family and Prince Muqrin and not happy about that one bit.) So Sidon has had the most opposition to Hariri dominance and now Hariri has some 73% of the Sunni vote there. In Beirut, the Hariri family has more support: it is around 80 to 83% of all Sunnis there. In the Biqa` it is only a bit less: maybe 75% of so. In Tripoli it is more complicated: If Hariri did not join forces with his former rival, Najib Miqati, he would have been embarrassed with the results. Miqati is a billionaire and all billionaires get elected and become leaders in that lousy deformed homeland called Lebanon. So in Tripoli, Hariri’s support has dwindled to the advantage of Najib Miqati (and to a lesser extent, Muhammad Safadi–another billionaire–kid you not). But Hariri voters have intensity that is similar to the intensity of Hizbullah voters: i.e. they are obnoxiously obedient to their sectarian leaders in orders and commands regarding in how they should vote, even if they vote for people they don’t like (like Hizbullah Shi`ite voters voted for Hariri candidate, Nuhad Mashnuq in Beirut–according to a previous agreement between Hizbullah and Hariri–and Hariri voters voted for a Phalange candidate, Samir Sa`adah in Tripoli against a popular Christian candidate, Jean `Ubayd. Walid Jumblat has around 70 to 75% of the votes of Druzes, and that has not changed. But there is more dissent among the Druzes (partly familial and traditional relating to the historical split between the Yazbaki and Jumblati family confederations. Among the Christians, now there is a clear shift. Hizbullah has become a burden to its Christian allies. `Awn is too stubborn and has done things that are clearly not popular among Christian voters: his visit to Iran and Syria prior to the election is one example. The Christian propaganda against `Awn was very effective. Don’t get me wrong: they all do blatant or coded sectarian propaganda in Lebanon but nobody is more effective and blatant thant the Hariri family and the March 14 camp–i.e., those on the payroll of Prince Muqrin bin `Abdul-`Aziz. Just to tell you how much `Awn has lost support among Christians: in the 2005 election, the difference between any of his candidates and the losers was more than 10,000 votes. In this election, the difference between Gen. `Awn himself and the losing candidate Mansur Al-Bawn was a mere 1500 votes. That tells you something. What I found more stunning is Zghorta. Somebody told me that Sulayman Franjiyyah looked very subdued in victory. The reason is in the numbers. In the last election (which was on the basis of larger districts where Franjiyyah lost because Sunni voters determined the outcome of elections in the North), an analysis of the Zghorto district shows that Franjiyyah received three times more votes than those who lost, like Nayla Mu`awwad, who obtained something like 20% of votes in the district itself (and yet she won with Sunni votes in the larger district). In this election, the difference between Sulayman Franjiyyah and the first losing candidate, Mishel Mu`awwad, was a mere 3000 votes. This is very big for Zghorta. Real big. So `Awn and Franjiyyah will now have to adjust and that will make them less antagonistic toward their Sunni rivals. This will increase the sectarian tone of Lebanese politics especially among the Christians. One can also add that the attack on Patriarch Sfayr (one of the most sectarian politicians in the country, and the one with the most harmful poisonous effects in Angry Arab’s opinions although I do concede that he has a vast hat collection) by `Awn and Franjiyyyah hurt them with voters. So with all this, what can one say: the Sunni-Shi`ite conflict (instigated by orders of Prince Muqrin and initiated by Rafiq Hariri in full force in 2000) has reached dangerous levels of polarization. People say that Hizbullah is too dominant for the Sunnis to start anything but the conflict can take many forms and in different places: like between Amal and Hariri militias in Biqa` or between Hariri Salafite militias in Tripoli and `Alawaites. The high level of polarization between Sunnis and Shi`ites–as evidenced by the numbers in this election–clearly point in a direction of instability and further conflict.’

68 (+3) vs 57

So the opposition will remain the opposition, the majority will remain the majority and the same issues that dominated the last few years of Lebanese politics will continue to dominate it. Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement remains the biggest christian party in parliament (they actually gained 3 extra seats, and now have 24), Hizbullah retains the same number of parliamentary delegates as before it declined to put forward more than its previously elected 11 candidates) so technically has neither won nor lost anything. Jumblatt has made a familiar 180 degree turnabout – literally as the results were coming in – and Israel is understandably pissed off that Hizbullah/the opposition didn’t win, thus denying them an easy excuse for bombing the shit out of the country again. Look forward to a hot political summer of infighting in Lebanon with a liberal dosis of civil unrest and violent incidents, although probably no imminent Israeli attack. But then, right until yesterday night, I – along with most analysts and all pollsters – thought that M8 was probably going to come out ahead of M14 in the elections, so what do we know…

Actually, on reviewing earlier posts about the predictions, it seems the pollsters as a whole were not that far off the mark: on May 12th, I wrote about ‘(…) an article in al-Akhbar which aggregates four predictions by pollsters for the upcoming parliamentary elections. The upshot seems to be that the current majority of M14 could get anywhere between 48 and 71 seats, while the current opposition of M8 is looking at between 57 and 80 seats, with the ‘guaranteed’ seats for each – i.e. districts with no competition at all – being respectively 36 (M14) and 37 (M8).’ At both extremes of the margins is the exact result each side obtained yesterday – if you count the 3 ‘independents’ (politicians with a local following who are not officially members of any party) on the M14-side. It would be interesting to find out, at some point in the future, exactly how much money USAid, the various Saudi muslim charities and other sponsors have spent on vote-buying, fuel vouchers and plane tickets to achieve the predicted maximum for their ‘pro-western‘ protégés… Although, as Angry Arab points out (and as the only analyst – to my knowledge – to consistently predict an M14-victory, he has just scored some major credits): ‘The theory that Hizbullah may have worked for the defeat of the opposition is gaining currency in some people’s mind. I mean, they may have watched the experience of Hamas and realized that Hamas would have been better off out of government. Now, they can sit and watch the Hariri government take the responsiblity and blame for the mess of Lebanese governance. Although MEMRI expects that Sami Gemayyel (on whom they just sent a flash bulletin) will personally disarm Hizbullah.’ Deen Sharp argues the same on his Lebanese Elections blog, quoting Carnegie’s Paul Salem, as does Abu Muqawama at the Foreign Policy blog.

http://angryarab.blogspot.com/2009/06/hizbullah.html

The worst of it all…

… is that Angry Arab was right…

Change and reform

Elias Muhanna, of the excellent Qifa Nabki blog, offers an in-depth look at the history, present and future of Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement – a real must-read for anybody who wants to understand today’s political landscape in Lebanon: ‘“Even if I agree that the weapons are a problem, how does that have anything to do with the fact that we need a new electoral law, or that we need to fight corruption, or that we need to protect our environment?” asks Alain Aoun. “The March 14 forces have made Hizbollah’s weapons their only issue while they neglect every other problem in the country, from the public debt to the electricity blackouts. We have a different approach.” What lies ahead for Lebanon? If the past four years are any indication, the election result is unlikely to lead to a brisk and decisive changing of the guard. Due to the tortuous nature of consensual politics, the choice of a prime minister and the formation of the government are likely to take time and require extensive deliberation. The nationwide stupor brought on by election fever – with all its promises of change and renewal – is bound to be followed by a rude awakening when politics resume their usual course on June 8. This should not distract from the underappreciated reality that Lebanon is in a process of significant change. Having emerged from the deep freeze of post-civil war reconstruction and the tutelage of the Syrian era, a national debate about various existential issues is beginning to take place. Questions about the viability of the consociational system, reform of the electoral law, and a credible defence strategy, among others, are beginning to be asked with increasing urgency, partly because – for the first time in decades – the Lebanese are in a position to answer them. The end of the Syrian occupation unleashed a surprisingly vibrant and energetic debate among ordinary Lebanese, much of it carried out on blogs, online news and social networking sites, and internet chat forums. Most of the political parties now maintain online message-boards, none larger than The Orange Room, a garrulous and impassioned community of Aoun obsessives. (…) Even as the FPM sits on the precipice of obtaining power, the unbounded arguments on its no-frills website retain the air of an aggrieved and strident underground opposition – the legacy of a movement that first took shape as a diffuse network of ideologically-committed university students and young professionals. The Aounist forums bring home the point – evident in the party’s electoral rhetoric but more conspicuous in the candid discussions between its partisans – that the FPM seems to occupy a hybrid position, somewhere between a traditional Lebanese confessional party orientated around a single charismatic leader, and a modern political movement committed to certain ideological principles. Listening to the Aounists talk amongst themselves it remains hard to determine whether their fervent wish is for a new Christian strongman in the form of Michel Aoun or for the secularist agenda that he espouses.
In its present role in the opposition, it has been easy for the FPM to criticise the majority without bearing responsibility for the decisions of government. But if the party prevails on June 7 and takes a decisive role in shaping the legislative agenda for the next four years, all eyes will be on the FPM to see if it wields the authority it has long sought to enact far-reaching reforms – or if the party and its allies, safe within the halls of the Second Republic, find its pillars too secure to topple.’

Orange kalashnikovs & Canadian plane tickets

Mitch Prothero went to one of Aoun’s election rallies in the Metn last saturday and witnessed an interesting real-life materialisation of the precarious balancing act going on within the ranks of the opposition: ‘What remains unknown is how Mr Aoun, who easily won the Christian vote in 2005, will fare now that he is aligned with Hizbollah and Amal. In the campaign rally, before a crowded room at the upscale Forum de Beirut shopping centre in al-Metn, a Christian suburb of Beirut, it became clear that balancing his message of nonsectarian governance and battling corruption is often overshadowed by his partnership with a Shiite community that has perhaps the worst relationship with the Christians of any group in Lebanon. Managing the perception that he is aligned with a pro-Syrian, conservative Muslim community dedicated to armed resistance to Israel and the West remains a tricky balancing act of not just religious and political values but also of economic class and culture.
Dozens of teenage boys waved Hizbollah flags and chanted “Allah, Nasrallah, and all of Dahiya” about an hour before Mr Aoun was due to take the stage. An organiser from the FPM immediately saw the sectarian nature of the chanting and politically problematic images that might upset Christian swing voters in the election’s most critical district. But getting rid of the youths posed no easy problem. As they were hustled off the floor, an Aoun official confronted the teenagers in the car park as they continued chanting Hizbollah-themed slogans.
“You are acting in a terrible way. You must stop these slogans; you can’t chant about being Shiite here,” the frustrated official, who would not give his name, said to the group of teenagers. When he stopped yelling at them, the crowd once again began chanting: “We are all Shiite, We are the Shiite.” Now visibly annoyed, the official tried to force them further from the venue before the media noticed them.
“Just leave, go back to Dahiya; we don’t want you here,” the man shouted.
“Nasrallah, Nasrallah! No fear, No fear. All of Dahiya will turn into a Kalashnikov!” responded the group, pushing the rhetoric into even more dangerous territory.
“Back on the buses,” Aoun officials shouted. “We don’t need you here. They need you back in Dahiya!” As the teenagers were hustled onto the buses – charted by Amal and Hizbollah to bring supporters to Mr Aoun’s rally – one young man holding a Hizbollah flag in one hand and a drum in the other, denied there was a problem with the Aounists.
“We are leaving because Sayid Hassan [Nasrallah, leader of Hizbollah] is speaking tonight and they need us in Dahiya to get ready for it,” he sheepishly claimed before refusing to give his name and scampering away.
After packing them back on to their buses for a return trip to the Shiite section of town, the visibly relived organisers then returned to the rally, where about 500 people waved the orange flags of the FPM and waited for the general to speak. Only a handful of Hizbollah flags could be seen in the back of the room, waved by dignified older women in headscarves.’

Despite the precarious nature of the Aoun-Nasrallah alliance, the M14 forces are worried enough to spend untold amounts of money to get expat Lebanese to come over and vote. MEA is flying in up to 8 extra planes per day these days. Offered a free holiday to the homeland, many enthusiastically accept the offer – although how many will actually vote – and for which party – is not entirely clear. A friend of mine who works in Saudi Arabia, for example, accepted the ticket (from the Future Movement, although he is not specifically ‘with’ them) but is leaving the country again before the elections even take place…: ‘Corporate sponsors are paying for hundreds of supporters of the pro-Western Future Movement in Calgary and in other Canadian cities to vote on June 7, CBC News has learned. Dual citizens must be physically present in Lebanon to cast a ballot in its elections. “This is a big election, and it is a lot of people who [would] love to vote but they cannot vote because of funds … so those companies are making it easy for them,” said Faouzi Salem, a Future Movement co-ordinator in Calgary.”There [are] sponsors in the world who [pay] for those tickets … European companies, Middle Eastern companies who … they would love to see free Lebanon, independent Lebanon. They want to see democratic government in the future, so they’re dedicating all their supports.” (…) The majority of the 1.5 million people that left Lebanon in the last 30 years — including during the civil war from 1976 to 1990 — for Canada, the United States and Australia oppose Hezbollah, which is why there’s such an effort to have their votes counted, said Elias Bejjani, chairman of the Lebanese Canadian Co-ordinating Council in Toronto. (…) There are rumours in the Lebanese-Canadian community that the pro-Hezbollah side is also paying to fly supporters to Lebanon for the election. “The other side too, they’re doing the same thing, no? They’re taking people from all over the world,” said Salem. Marie-Joelle Zahar, a political science professor at the Université de Montréal and a former journalist who covered the Lebanese civil war, said the election could ring up record-breaking expenditures. “It is a phenomenal amount of money. This is shaping up to be the most expensive election of all times, anywhere, per capita. We’re talking something that will be more expensive than elections in the U.S. That is quite mind-boggling. There’s a lot riding on this election internally.”‘
Ben Gilbert has more on the subject of vote-buying here at GlobalPost.com.

And as a final trinket, watch this Youtube  video featuring Sleiman Frangieh, leader of the Marada party (basically a small local fiefdom in the north, allied with M8). It is called ‘Sleiman Frangieh politely addressing his civilised supporters ‘. No subtitles I’m afraid, but the general atmosphere is pretty clear without translation anyway… Franjieh is basically scolding his supporters for causing trouble with supporters of his opponents, among other things calling the local village population ‘30,000 donkeys’ and saying ‘leave the fighting to the Ouet (Lebanese Forces).

Doing a Kanaan in the land of Canaan…

These spy stories are getting weirder and weirder – now it’s spreading to Israel, where a military intelligence head did a Ghazi Kanaan: ‘An officer in a sensitive position in Military Intelligence shot himself in the head on his base yesterday, in an apparent suicide. The Military Police are investigating whether the suicide was due to personal circumstances or his intelligence work. (…) The officer’s death was received with shock in the unit, which is considered MI’s most exclusive. Military sources told Haaretz that their preliminary investigation found no indications that the officer was contemplating suicide. Suicides have been on the rise in the IDF in recent months. However, at this point, the incidents appear to be unrelated. Most of the victims are conscript soldiers.’ And while we’re in the mood for synchronicity (or maybe we should call it serendipity), what’s the connection with this: five Lebanese were on board the Air France flight that mysteriously disappeared last night…?