Wikileaks on 2006 Iraeli attack part 2

Document Beirut 2403: Excerpts – July 16, 2006/

Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman in a late night meeting with Terje Roed Larsen & Geir Pederson, in Larsen’s suite at the Phoenicia Hotel. Pederson later left the meeting to join other members of the UN delegation in Beirut and to prevent the interpretation that the US & UN were in cahoots….
Larsen said that he had an excellent meeting with Siniora and Berri who was overwhelmed by a inert desire to ‘seize the opportunity’ but was held back by the popular mood… Larsen was adamant to restrict his ‘initiative’ to Berri & Siniora, and did not wish the incorporation of the ‘naive ones like Michel Aoun and Saad Hariri.’

Walid Jumblatt & Marwan Hamadeh were clearly concerned with Israel’s MO of ‘surgical bombardment’, and hoped that it continues with it war until they inflict quasi destruction of Hezbollah’s infrastructure, even if this entailed the occupation of south Lebanon. Jumblatt stressed that publicly he was going to call for a cease fire but that he sees in the continuation of hostilities an opportunity to destro Hezbollah.
In that meeting, over a bottle of wine, 3 bottles of Corona & Vodka (the origin of which led to a long argument between Jumblatt and an overwhelmed room service waiter), the Druze leader went through an encapsulation of March14′ thinking.
Jumblatt was not happy to see that Israel has not destroyed enough of Hezbollah’s infrastructure and capabilities… and complsined that a cease fire would give Hezbollah a victory. He frankly conveyed that he prefers the continuation of the hostilities..
Ambassador Feltman asked Jumblatt what does Israel needs to do to inflict maximum damage on Hezbollah: Jumblatt replied that Israel is fighting a conventional war … What is needed is an invasion of south Lebabon, cleaning the area to allow the redeployment of the LAF … .Jumblatt concluded that there are only two possible outcomes: total victory or total defeat of Hezbollah, no gray zones!

Beirut Document 2490 – Meeting between Ambassador Feltman & Marwan Hamadeh, in the later’s home, attended by Ghassan Tueini…
Hamadeh told the ambassador that the July 27th’s meeting of the Council of Ministers saw an ‘epic’ confrontation between Hamadeh vs all of President Lahoud, the Shia’ ministers and some of ‘weak technocrats’ from Hariri’s Future bloc…
Hamadeh informed the ambassador that he called Saad Hariri in Saudi Arabia and told him “do not return now, because you will be swamped in Quraitem by 20,000 hungry beggars”. Hariri relayed the kindest regards from the Saudi leadership to Walid Jumblatt …

It is worth pointing out that ‘ambassador’ Feltman is currently personally directing the Saudi occupation forces in Bahrain. Also, look at Egypt right now: they are following Lebanon’s path – as soon  as M14 lost their hold on Lebanon’s security services, the latter started uncovering and dismantling one Israeli spy network after the other. The Egyptian security services – only halfway cleansed of Mubarak goons yet – are already following suit: ‘(…) the alleged spy ring was gathering information about the Egyptian army, who has been in control of the country following Former President Hosni Mubarak’s ouster earlier this year. The group was allegedly spying on the armed forces during the uprising that led to Mubarak’s toppling. At the time, an Israeli Channel 10 correspondent was arrested by Egyptian intelligence as he photographed armed forces in Cairo. He was forced to return to Israel, as were three other journalists said to be of Israel’s Channel 2. Images of the trio had been broadcast prominently on Egyptian state television, with police officers holding up their passports to the cameras.’



Wikileaks on the 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon – it is beginning!

Doc. Number 2602/ August 12, 2006
Hariri meeting Jeffrey Feltman (Excerpts) Original will be availbale once site releases it)
(…) Hariri believes that, despite Hezbollah’s bravado, the resistance is badly bruised and weakened politically.

Hariri said that Nabih Berri’s dream to to ‘get rid of Hezbollah’ and that Berri is upset with Hezbollah, waiting for the dust to settle to use his rejuvenated popular support to ‘pressure Hezbollah in order to control it…’ Hariri believes that it was Berri who imposed his will on Hezbollah and pressured them to accept the North-Litani redeployment … Hariri thinks these moves are the ‘beginning of the end’ for the resistance. (comment: when Ambassador feltman met with minister Ghazi Aridi he was told that parallel to the Paris conference of Donors, an Arab fund was being created and it would include Iran … This fund was to be ‘supervised by Berri’ ) Ambassador Feltman raised the ‘Berri family finances’ with Hariri and pressed upon him the need of preventing Berri and his wife Randa from tapping into any fund, as is customary.
Hariri asked ambassador Feltman to ‘keep his remarks confidential’ and reiterated the need to remove Lahoud, Suleiman & Georges Khoury (head of Army Intelligence) because they are certified Syrian & Hezbollah agents …and hoped to recruit Nabih Berri towards these noble goals! Hariri asked Feltman to help in keeping the pressure on Syria and Iran to ‘destabilize them’… Finally, Hariri asked that for an immediate formation of the ‘Tribunal’ in order to use it as a ‘sword above Syria & Iran’s necks’ and weaken their Lebanese agents!
Comment: Hariri spoke of his concerns that the airport was still being used to smuggle weapons for Hezbollah and belittled Nabih Berri’s reputation as ’embezzler’and said that he skimmed ‘only 10-15%’ to rebuild the South and line his pockets …
[Comment: Hariri wants to get rid of Lahoud and (especially) Suleiman but could not name anyone to replace them both ..
Hariri lowered his voice and shook his head .. We believe that was a sincere acknowledgement that he was thankful we pressed upon him to name Siniora instead of Bahij Tabbarah, despite a shaky start, rocked by jealousy … We believe that Siniora and Hariri will cooperate in the future, and hoped that Hariri would remain in Lebanon because his frequent leisurly travels with large entourage, and lavish stays at the Plaza Athenee, did not go down well when Lebanon was being bombarded, and that did not bode well for March 14. End comment]

Document number 2513/Beirut
(Excerpts below. Original to be released later)
August 1, 2006.
Meeting between Ambassador Feltman & MP Boutros Harb.
Harb, a presidential hopeful, lamented that albeit the toll of Israeli war on Lebanon was steep, it ‘remains without a good conclusion.’… Harb worries that Nasrallah could still cpme out a ‘winner’ from this debacle, because he is seemingly destroying the myth of an invincible IDF, and gaining international sympathy …
Harb worries that the war is now in its 20th day, and that is giving Arabs in general that Israel can be defeated and ultimately destroyed… He also warned that the attack on Qana was playing into Hezbollah’s hands and gaining it popular support …
Harb was saddened to see that the Israeli war did not weaken Hezbollah and stressed that a cesafire was going to make Hezbollah the ‘region’s Rambo!’.
Harb further stressed that it was going to be a ‘catastrphy’ should Hezbollah come out of all this ‘stronger’… Harb warned Feltman that if this happened, Hezbollah would be well positioned to impose the Wilayat al Faqih on all Lebanese, … and ultimately, spark the Sunni-Shii’ showdown it longs for.
Harb went on and made some ‘policy recommendations’ but acknowledged that it was ‘easier said than done’. Harb said that it was unfortunate that Hezbollah’s physical presence was not centralized, making it military defeat difficult. But Harb still hoped for a military defeat of Hezbollah, although he predicted that this defeat would be coensated by an increase in Hezbollah’s popularity.
Harb proposed that Israel advances into Lebanon, and occupies Hezbollah’s strogholds in Marun el Rass & Bint Jbeil .. Harb stressed the importance of this happening before the US imposition of a cease fire….”

Defending education in times of war and occupation: Iraqi academics

The Brussells Tribunal,  the University of Ghent-Menarg, Vrede vzw and others organise a conference on Iraqi academics and their struggle to defend education and independent scholarship under occupation. Between March 9th and 11th, numerous academics and journalists, including Dahr Jamail and Raymond Baker, will report on the current state of intellectual life and the right to education in Iraq and discuss solutions. The third day is devoted to workshops. For registration and info go here.

Israel is a colony, remember?

I have been asked to spread the word on this conference, which aims to return the discussion of the zionist problem to its proper framework, which is that of a colonial issue. This used to be the way it was approached by academics and activists alike, way back when the world was not yet exclusively seen through the lenses of neo-liberalism and religious fundamentalism. Not to mention, in academic circles, through the lens of post-colonialism…



SOAS Palestine Society Conference Organizing Collective

On 5-6 March 2011, the Palestine Society at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London will hold its seventh annual conference, “Past is Present: Settler Colonialism in Palestine.” This year’s conference aims to understand Zionism as a settler colonial project which has, for more than a century, subjected Palestine and Palestinians to a structural and violent form of destruction, dispossession, land appropriation and erasure in the pursuit of a new Jewish Israeli society. By organizing this conference, we hope to reclaim and revive the settler colonial paradigm and to outline its potential to inform and guide political strategy and mobilization.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is often described as unique and exceptional with little resemblance to other historical or ongoing colonial conflicts. Yet, for Zionism, like other settler colonial projects such as the British colonization of Ireland or European settlement of North America, South Africa or Australia, the imperative is to control the land and its resources — and to displace the original inhabitants. Indeed, as conference keynote speaker Patrick Wolfe, one of the foremost scholars on settler colonialism and professor at La Trobe University in Victoria, Australia, argues, “the logic of this project, a sustained institutional tendency to eliminate the Indigenous population, informs a range of historical practices that might otherwise appear distinct–invasion is a structure not an event.”

Therefore, the classification of the Zionist movement as a settler colonial project, and the Israeli state as its manifestation, is not merely intended as a statement on the historical origins of Israel, nor as a rhetorical or polemical device. Rather, the aim is to highlight Zionism’s structural continuities and the ideology which informs Israeli policies and practices in Palestine and toward Palestinians everywhere. Thus, the Nakba — whether viewed as a spontaneous, violent episode in war, or the implementation of a preconceived master plan — should be understood as both the precondition for the creation of Israel and the logical outcome of Zionist settlement in Palestine.

Moreover, it is this same logic that sustains the continuation of the Nakba today. As remarked by Benny Morris, “had he [David Ben Gurion] carried out full expulsion–rather than partial–he would have stabilised the State of Israel for generations.”[ii] Yet, plagued by an “instability”–defined by the very existence of the Palestinian nation–Israel continues its daily state practices in its quest to fulfill Zionism’s logic to maximize the amount of land under its control with the minimum number of Palestinians on it. These practices take a painful array of manifestations: aerial and maritime
bombardment, massacre and invasion, house demolitions, land theft, identity card confiscation, racist laws and loyalty tests, the wall, the siege on Gaza, cultural appropriation, and the dependence on willing (or unwilling) native collaboration and security arrangements, all with the continued support and backing of imperial power.

Despite these enduring practices however, the settler colonial paradigm has largely fallen into disuse. As a paradigm, it once served as a primary ideological and political framework for all Palestinian political factions and trends, and informed the intellectual work of committed academics and revolutionary scholars, both Palestinians and Jews.

The conference thus asks where and why the settler colonial paradigm was lost, both in scholarship on Palestine and in politics; how do current analyses and theoretical trends that have arisen in its place address present and historical realities? While acknowledging the creativity of these new interpretations, we must nonetheless ask: when exactly did Palestinian natives find themselves in a “post-colonial” condition? When did the ongoing struggle over land become a “post-conflict” situation? When did Israel become a “post-Zionist” society? And when did the fortification of Palestinian ghettos and reservations become “state-building”?

Such an alignment would expand the tools available to Palestinians and their solidarity movement, and reconnect the struggle to its own history of anti-colonial internationalism. At its core, this internationalism asserts that the Palestinian struggle against Zionist settler colonialism can only be won when it is embedded within, and empowered by, the broader Arab movement for emancipation and the indigenous, anti-racist and anti-colonial movement-from Arizona to Auckland.

SOAS Palestine Society invites everyone to join us at what promises to be a significant intervention in Palestine activism and scholarship. For over 30 years, SOAS Palestine Society has heightened awareness and understanding of the Palestinian people, their rights, culture, and struggle for self-determination, amongst students, faculty, staff, and the broader public. SOAS Palestine society aims to continuously push the frontiers of discourse in an effort to make provocative arguments and to stimulate debate and organizing for justice in Palestine through relevant conferences, and events ranging from the intellectual and political impact of Edward Said’s life and work (2004), international law and the Palestine question (2005), the economy of Palestine and its occupation (2006), the one state (2007), 60 Years of Nakba, 60 Years of Resistance (2009), and most recently, the Left in Palestine (2010).

For more information on the SOAS Palestine Society 7th annual conference, Past is Present: Settler Colonialism in Palestine:

SOAS Palestine Society Organizing Collective is a group of committed students that has undertaken to organize annual academic conferences on Palestine since 2003.


[i] Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event, Cassell, London, p. 163

[ii] Interview with Benny Morris, Survival of the Fittest, Haaretz, 9. January 2004,

Don’t even try – you can’t beat us…

From today’s Daily Star: “Those concerned about the lack of a government in Lebanon can take heart – the country is unlikely to come near the record-breaking 250 days without a coalition that Belgium is almost certain to reach Friday. At least that’s what Belgium’s bicycling ambassador to Lebanon, Johan Verkammen, thinks. In an interview with The Daily Star, Verkammen joked of the record, whose current holder is Iraq on 249 days, that “once we have a record, we want to keep it.” On a more serious note, he said he thought it was unlikely Lebanon would be without a government as long as Belgium. “I have the impression, although of course you never know, that talks have advanced already on the formation of this new government.” Regarding the probability that Prime Minister-designate Najib Mikati will form a government without the March 14 coalition, Verkammen remarked that “it’s not up to [non-Lebanese] to say what kind of coalition should be in the government in Lebanon. Certainly coming from Belgium where we know how difficult it is, you will not hear me saying how the Lebanese should do it.” The lack of a governing coalition is not the only parallel between the two outwardly-different countries. Belgium’s system of government divides power between the federal government, the country’s three linguistic communities, and its three regions.
Lebanon’s confessional system, which comprises 18 confessional groups, is different and perhaps more complex than Belgium’s, but Verkammen said that “it’s perhaps a little easier for us [in Belgium] to understand how to manage this diversity within a country, with different communities.” Verkammen attributed the current Belgian deadlock to controversy over institutional reforms. “As you can see from the crisis in Belgium [democracy is] always a work in progress, it’s always evolving,” he said. “But if you can make it evolve according to the wishes of the people, and through democratic dialogue, that’s fine, I think.”

Meanwhile in the background…

It is easy right now, with revolutions going on and riots and protests raging all over the Arab world, to lose sight of the ongoing Israel-Hezbollah conflict. Yet challenges have recently been flying over and back on both sides, with Ehud Barak claiming in a speech on an IDF base that ‘we may have to go back in soon since Hezbollah seems to have forgotten the lesson we taught it in 2006 (sic)’ and Nasrallah retorting that ‘if you attack Lebanon again, we will liberate Northern Galilee’. Now both of these statements reveal nothing new. I have argued in this blog before that Israel is hidebound on a self-destructive, suicidal course. Its leaders are very akin to the Mubaraks and Ben Alis of this world: they are so used to having their every whim attended to without a whimper of criticism or protest, that they have long ago lost the ability to think clearly and see reality for what it is. In Barak’s case: despite facts on the ground and the Winograd commission’s conclusions about the dilapidated state of the IDF, he refuses to concede that the fourth strongest army in the world, with all its hi-tech gadgetry, was utterly unable to even seriously dent a group of lightly-armed but determined guerillas. All the IDF managed to do in 2006 was what it is actually good at: massacring unarmed civilians, preferably from a mile up in the sky. As soon as they were confronted with actual trained fighters, it was they who took a beating and were forced to retreat dismally licking their wounds. Even their much-vaunted Merkava tanks were no match for Hezbollah. But as some dude in the US state department once said: the Israelis are like a guy who sets fire to his hair and then bangs his head with a hammer to put out the flames. They are unlikely to actually learn from their mistakes and will continue to underestimate their enemies. On the other hand, I have long argued on this blog that the logical next step for Hezbollah – not the type of people to get conceited and overly confident to the point of being blinded to all signs of reality – in any coming conflict would be to actually invade Israel. The mere psychological effect of the zionist state actually losing land for the first time in 70 years or so would be devastating enough to bring an  end to this religious colonial adventure. Having in all probability lost the support of the Egyptian dictatorship – depending on the outcome of the ongoing events – and additionally facing a situation where their other dictator friends in the Arab world, from Jordan to Saudi Arabia to Morocco, are now politically unable to be seen as even passively supporting any Israeli military adventures, the odds are in any case stacked against them much more than in 2006 or even 2008. Do not underestimate how the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions have galvanised minds both in the Arab world and in Europe in favour of the Arab ‘street’ (as opposed to its republican and monarchic dictatorships), or the importance of Bahrainis, Algerians, Libyans, Yemenis and Jordanians shedding their fear of their own regimes. With Palestinians already protesting both Fatah and Hamas – who both play a major part in protecting Israel – and Arabs in general emboldened and furious, going to war now would be the worst choice the zionist state could make – and if history isany guide, there is therefore a high likelihood that that is exactly the choice it will make. Don’t forget that Israel could have had peace for over ten years already, with all member states of the Arab League and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, not to mention the UN backing the Saudi proposal for peace within the 1967 borders. Israel has consistently refused to even discuss this perfectly sensible option, just like it has consistently refused Syrian peace offers in return for the Golan Heights, and just like it keeps legitimising and strengthening Hezbollah by occupying the Shebaa farms and Ghajjar.

As Nick Noe puts it on Mideastwire today: “[An Israeli attack on Lebanon] is precisely what Hizbullah has said it very much wants… And I am convinced that this is indeed a genuine, shared strategic approach among key figures in the Party. In this changing strategic balance, Hizbullah seems to be calculating that a large ground invasion – as is being pumped up in Israel on a daily basis, i.e. the reason they “lost” the last war is because they did not punch hard enough into lebanon in 2006 with boots on the ground – that this movement which Barak confidently bellowed today will be a gross miscalculation on the part of the IDF… and would lead to the IDF’s effective collapse.”

Nick sees three possibler scenarios: “This is one end game: Hizbullah leaderships desired endgame I would submit. The other one is that Israel and the US change their negotiating positions enough re: Syria and the Palestinians and undercut the Resistance Axis…. or the third end game where Israel realizes it cannot reasonably ATTACK, it sits back behind its walls and domes and de-legit campaigns and steadily enough people emigrate from Israel, there is enough internal decay and division, that the Jewish state of Israel demographically collapses…”

Theoretically, these are indeed all possible endgames, but I think the US and Israel are too ideologically entrenched and power mad to go for the second option, while the third is not a realistic option because Israel cannot keep its various feuding factions united without the common enemy and regular warfare. In short, I do think the Israelis are getting desperate right now, and that additionally are blind, irrational and suicidal enough to lash out wildly at the nearest enemy ignoring all consequences of their actions. I am furthermore convinced that they will not only lose that war, but will lose ‘their’ country in doing so. But then, I have also regularly argued on this blog – and even more to friends and colleagues in Beirut – that the Arab populations were about to explode and that revolution was around the corner. Nobody listened then and I am not expecting anybody to listen now…

Oh really? How unexpected…

For the nth time since August 2006, Israel announced it would pull out of the northern part of Ghajjar, a village straddling the Lebanese border, and then reneged on its promise. The excuse this time round? ‘Why, the ‘Hezbollah government’, of course. Never mind that Hezbollah has been taking part in the previous two governments too, and already had a blocking third, i.e. veto power in the last, Hariri-led government. Reality and facts are never an issue for the US-Israeli camp, it is propaganda value that counts… Mideastwire (written by Nicholas Noe, one of a handful of US analysts who bothers to go and live in an Arab country and learn the language, and the guy who recently broke the Wisner-PattonBoggs-Mubarak story, which he keeps updating on the blog) puts it succinctly: ‘As expected, the Israelis are pursuing the failed strategy of holding “cards” to use later rather than withdraw and help to remove some of the rationale for Hezbollah’s growing armed resistance. From Naharnet: An Israeli official has said that a plan to withdraw from the Lebanese side of the occupied border village of Ghajar is now on hold due to recent changes in the region, including Lebanon. “We don’t want to give the Hizbullah government free gifts,” the official in Jerusalem told Israel’s Ynet news website, hinting that for the time being the plan to withdraw from the northern part of Ghajar has been frozen. The Israeli security cabinet approved a plan to pull forces out from the Lebanese side of Ghajar around three months ago. Under the plan, Israeli troops were to withdraw from the area and leave it under UNIFIL’s authority. “The idea was to boost the moderates, not the extremists,” the official said. “Today it’s problematic to hand over Ghajar to the Hizbullah government. We are discussing the matter with the U.N. and UNIFIL. Back in December we couldn’t have predicted the current instability and Hizbullah toppling the government.” “Nothing will happen before the Hariri report comes out,” the Israeli official said in reference to the indictment that will eventually be made public by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.’

Sharia4Belgium against Hezbollah, wtf?

So we went to this demo in Brussels today in support of the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions. Many Belgian Arabs and quite a few white Belgians showed up, maybe a thousand people in all at the most busy moment towards the end. It was a friendly affair most of the time, with people genuinely supportive of the cause while representing only themselves, but there were a few annoying aspects to it. Firstly, and this is not new, there were a lot of flags of all kinds of obscure leftist groupuscules using the demonstration to show off their presence – which is fine in itself, even if the actual revolution is grassroots and not depending on any ideology. The Egyptian and Tunisian communists – like their counterparts in Venzuela and Bolivia – have of course been totally overtaken in speed and proven utterly irrelevant, left to moan together at the bar – all fifteen of them – about how the masses just totally ignore all the conditions set by Marx and Lenin as to how true revolutions should come about.Whatever, this is hardly new.

More annoyingly – although most people just ignored them – there were two small competing sections of  religionists. On the one hand, there were the Hezbollah fans – who insisted on turning the demo into a kind of ashura event, beating their chests and shouting ya Hussein. On the other hand, even more annoyingly, there were the Saudi-sponsored total dickheads of Sharia4Belgium, who carried Saudi flags into an anti-Mubarak demonstration and actually started harrassing the Hezbollah shia section. I mean, seriously, while on Maidan Tahrir the muslims are forming one front with the copts, back here in Brussels the brainwashed wahhabi idiots choose this opportunity to start sectarian infighting with the only muslim group which has actually been able to defeat the supposed common enemy… Great going! And so totally compatible with the demands of their Saudi sponsors, who are desperately trying to keep Mubarak in power, in close coordination with the Israelis and Americans. It is hilarious, by the way, to see that of the ten or so guys – no women in sight of course – who make up this way-out sect, and who seem to be genuinely convinced that they will be ruling Belgium – under sharia law no less – in a matter of years if not months, half are white converts from Antwerp. I mean, as doomed causes go, you can’t go much better than this. The only thing Belgians ever massively come out onto the streets for, is to protest attempts to impose a national closing hour for bars, and you want to impose sharia on this country? Hell yeah and good luck to ya. This confirms my theory that salafist groups are becoming exactly like late-twentieth century anarchist and communist groups: a bunch of wild-eyed youths preaching to each other at closed events, totally irrelevant to anything that is really happening out there. Come the revolution, the jihadis and salafis are found at the same bars as the communists, moaning how nobody ever listens to them. Only they can’t even wallow in drink to forget their utter irrelevance…

By the way, contrary to all our expectations, even Belgian state television (VRT) resisted the opportunity so enthusiastically provided by these sharia dickheads who got electrified whenever they saw a camera, to put the entire demo in a bad light by concentrating on them. Instead, they were cut out of the report completely, as was the Hezbollah faction.

The tribunal, Hariri and Hizbullah: the whole story

Marc Sirois illustrates with an excellent article on Merip why the Daily Star was actually worth reading back when he was its editor in chief – and before Hariri bought it and turned it into another Future mouthpiece. Read the entire piece here: “The government collapse started with the defection of MP and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, a March 14 stalwart since the alliance’s formation following Rafiq al-Hariri’s death, and six members of his Democratic Gathering. Jumblatt, whose adherence to the Hariri camp had constituted a major departure from his record, had been increasingly at odds with some March 14 stances since August 2009. Now he completed his volte-face, opining that the Tribunal could not deliver justice because it had degenerated into a “bazaar of blackmail and counter-blackmail.”  Absent other changes Jumblatt’s defection would have deadlocked Parliament, with both March 8 and March 14 commanding 64 seats.

But then former Maronite warlord Samir Geagea announced that his Lebanese Forces party would stand by Hariri. He also ridiculed the expected March 8 candidate, veteran former Prime Minister Omar Karami, and this outburst probably ruined Hariri’s chances. Karami is the younger brother of the late Rashid Karami, another slain premier whose assassination in 1987 is widely attributed to the aforementioned Geagea. Rashid Karami was a highly respected statesman, particularly in the northern city of Tripoli, which he represented — and it so happens that a couple of more independent-minded MPs, people on whose votes March 14 had been counting, hail from the same place. Geagea’s comments were taken as an insult to the memory of one of Tripoli’s favorite sons. If even one of the Tripoli bloc had bolted, March 8 would have been in the driver’s seat. One of these Tripoli MPs was Najib Miqati, a telecommunications tycoon whose brief tenure as interim prime minister in 2005 earned him considerable credit for managing the first elections held after Syrian forces withdrew following the elder Hariri’s death. Shortly after Geagea’s attack on Karami, Miqati announced that he had put his name forward as a compromise candidate. This move earned him all manner of accusations from the Hariri camp, which sent its supporters into the streets to express their rage at the “traitor.”

Although the pro-Hariri camp has continued to cry “coup,” accused March 8 of sowing sectarian divisions and claimed that the altered balance of power in Parliament violates the will of the electorate, March 8’s maneuver was carried out in accordance with constitutional provisions. The only “violation” was of the pledge made during negotiations in 2008 at Doha that the opposition ministers would not bring down the government. But when their rivals continued to champion the Tribunal, effectively going against their own promise at Doha not to govern unilaterally, the opposition judged themselves free to do so.

So is Miqati really “the Hizballah candidate,” as Future TV, the mouthpiece television station of Hariri’s Future Movement, dismissed him during its evening newscast on January 24? It is hard to see how. At the most basic level, even the walkout that brought Hariri down included just two Hizballah members. The rest came from the Free Patriotic Movement (4), Amal (3) and former cabinet minister Suleiman Franjieh’s Marada grouping — plus one non-aligned minister, ‘Adnan Sayyid Husayn. Even when Jumblatt’s change of allegiance made Hariri’s ouster possible, March 8’s preferred candidate was the aging Karami, certainly more friendly to their interests but hardly a Hizballah puppet. There were still plenty of congenial Sunni politicians to pick from, but these men were bypassed in favor of Miqati precisely because he was thought capable of gaining consensus support.’

Rafiq Hariri and the CIA

Very interesting story via the ever fascinating Sic Semper Tyrannis (blog by Pat Lang, a former US marine). I have no idea how much of it is true and how much planted, but if you are into shady espionage novels, it is definitely worth a read – there’s a lot about Bashir Gemayyel as another failed CIA tool as well: ‘Following the [Taif] accord, the Saudis arranged for Hariri to become the Lebanese prime minster, even though Hariri  for six years was a Saudi citizen and a subject of the Saudi king.  (He remained a Saudi citizen until his death. ) By the time of his return to Lebanon, Hariri’s worth was reliably estimated  by  U.S. sources to be between four and five billion dollars. By 2004, it was estimated to be $10  billion. Said a former senior U.S. intelligence source, “The increase had resulted from the continuing flow of monies from Saudi Arabia in addition to the billions that he and his Lebanese partners have looted from the Lebanese economy.” All the while some in the CIA  assumed Hariri was their man, ignoring the fact that the  Saudis were the directing force, and not realizing that all the while, the same Wahabi  factions that funded Hiriri were also busy giving money to extremist Sunni groups whose aim was to reassert Sunni dominance of the eastern Mediterranean. And all the while Hariri advanced such interests portraying himself as a defender of the Sunnis against the Shia and different Christian communities in Lebanon. […]  He was quite incapable of shame,  encouraging attacks against minority religious figures and did nothing to prevent attacks against the Christian leaders as well. In Syria, he used his Wahabi money to buy the cooperation of the Syrian branch of the Syrian Baath Party. To do this, Harari took the sons of such figures as Hikmat Shilabi, Abd al-Halim Khaddam and Mustafa Tlas as his “partners.” Before the death of then Syrian President Hafiz Assad, Hariri and his Saudi backers believed that the resultant unrest caused by the inexperience of Assad’s son, Bashar, meant that Khaddam could safely be made president overseeing the restoration of majority Sunni rule in Syria under Wahabi influence. But Assad had become aware that Hariri posed a threat to the succession of his son, and removed Hariri from office as a precaution. In a flash, a delegation arrived in Damascus from Saudi Arabia protesting Hariri’s fall. The members of the delegation were all members of the Suderi faction of the Royal Family and all devotees of the Wahabi cult.  The delegation demanded that Hariri undergo a gradual “rehabilitation” that would end by restoring him to office. They threatened that if this were not done, Bashar would never be received in Riyadh.  Assad’s reaction was to say lamely that he would think about it, but in fact, he immediately phoned Crown Prince Abdullah in Riyadh to tell the prince what his guests had just said. Abdullah reacted by inviting Bashar to Riyadh in the coming weeks to make clear that he, Abdullah, was in command, not the Wahabi fanatics. In a campaign that appealed to the most vile bigotry and inflammatory prejudice on the part of Muslims against Jews and Christians, including allegations that Muslim candidates who opposed him were secret converts to Christianity or agents of the CIA,  combined with huge bribes paid to officials and directly to the electorate, Hariri was restored to office in September 2000.’